Slowly, slowly. I'm in the middle of chapter 10, "The Israeli-Egyptian Peace, 1977-79." Overall, I think the work suffers from a failure to create vivid characters out of the historical actors, but this particular section, especially the narrative of the Camp David talks between Carter, Sadat, and Begin in September of 1978, is an exception. Fewer facts and figures, more on the personalities--I hope this trend perists as Morris comes up to present time. The enjoyment is sometimes that of fly-on-the-wall revelations:
The Egyptians and Israelis were asked not to discuss the proceedings with journalists and to channel everything through Carter's press secretary. "It was imperative that there be a minimum of posturing," Carter explained. He rejected Brzezinski's suggestion that the guest quarters be bugged to give the Americans an intelligence edge.
Sadat arrived with a hard-line document and separate "modifications" that amounted to fall-back positions. Carter knew the main document was a non-starter. Morris writes,
Just before the three men met, Carter asked to see Begin privately and warned him that Sadat's position paper would be "aggressive." Begin was cautioned not to "over-react." At the tripartite meeting, Sadat spent ninety minutes reading out his "Framework." Begin listened patiently. At the end Carter suggested that if Begin would just sign, it would save everybody a lot of time. There were "gales of genuine laughter" and the meeting ended in good cheer.
It didn't last. When the tripartite talks reached an impasse, the Americans undertook the drafting of documents, which they then discussed separately with the Israelis and Egyptians. It's clear that the Americans, and Carter in particular, regarded Begin as the greater obstacle:
Presenting the American draft to the Israelis, Carter said he believed Sadat would accept the essentials. Begin argued over almost every word, particularly a passage relating to the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force. Carter: "Do you reject UN Resolution 242?" Begin declined to commit himself explicitly on 242 but then asked to delete all reference to that resolution from the document. . . . "If you don't espouse 242, it is a terrible blow to peace," the president said. "If I were an Arab, I would prefer the present Israeli occupation to this proposal of yours," he added. The president later apparently described Begin as a "psycho."
And again:
In a private meeting with Carter, Begin urged that Resolution 242 be left out of the agreement and implied that there could be no territorial compromise regarding the West Bank. He could not go against the will of the Israeli people, he argued. Carter responded that most Israelis were willing to give up the Sinai settlements for peace and were willing to withdraw from "substantial portions" of the West Bank as well. In stating this position, Carter argued, he represented the Israeli people more accurately than Begin. The two men then chewed over and over the same points, and Carter accused Begin of being willing to forgo peace "just to keep a few illegal settlers on Egyptian land"--in a "heated. . . unpleasant" discussion.
To my surprise, Ariel Sharon, at the time Israel's Agriculture Minister, was in Morris's view instrumental in persuading Begin to relent:
[B]oth Weizman and Agriculture Minister Sharon, the latter calling Begin from Jerusalem, argued that if peace with Egypt depended on uprooting the settlements, then the price had to be paid.
But the biggest hero is President Carter. When negotiations were at the point of breaking down, he "was indefatigable, putting in twenty-hour days, exhibiting 'bulldoglike persistence' as well as a mastery of every problem and argument, however minor." And, after agreement was reached, Morris writes:
For Carter, their chief engineer, the Camp David accords represented a personal triumph. All who attended agreed subsequently that without his authority, mastery of detail, ready grasp of the issues, empathy, persuasive charm, and occasionally firmness, no agreement would have been possible.
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