To satisfy myself that this really happened, I'm going to type out what I think I saw. Let me know if I'm missing something.
Packers trailing Buccaneers 31-23 with 2:10, give or take a few seconds, left in the game. Packers have the ball on Bucs 8-yard-line, fourth down and goal to go. They kick a field goal to make the score 31-26. Right? That describes the situation they were in and the decision they made.
In the manner of a scientist, I'm trying to understand what could be said in favor of the view I disagree with. Before, the Packers needed a touchdown and a 2-point conversion to tie. Now, because they kicked a field goal, a touchdown puts them into the lead. Instead of needing a touchdown and 2-point conversion to tie, they need only a touchdown to win.
But, to get this "deal," Green Bay has to kick the ball off to Tampa Bay with around 125 seconds left, and—the crucial point—they still need to score a touchdown. They had been eight yards away from what could have been a tying touchdown. Now about the best they can hope for is getting the ball back on their own 30 with maybe 100 seconds left, no timeouts, and 70 yards to cover. That's if Tampa Bay doesn't get a first down. A first down clinches it for Tampa (which is what happened).
Or the Packers could have tried to score a touchdown from the 8-yard-line. Even if they fail on fourth down, they're playing defense at the 8-yard-line, with a chance to get the ball back at about midfield. If they get a touchdown but fail on the 2-point conversion, they're kicking off, just as they are after a field goal, but now they're behind by two points instead of five and no longer need a touchdown. The third possibility is best for them: they get a touchdown, add the 2-point conversion, and tie the score. Some in-game decisions are hard but not this one. It's one of those times when I hear in my head the voice of an old colleague, now deceased, who one day around 35 years ago was amused by my surprise at something dumb one of our customers had done. "Oh, Eric," he chided me, "eventually you'll learn that the amount of incompetence in the world is truly staggering."
UPDATE
An ESPN article taking up this question includes the following paragraphs:
According to ESPN's Win Probability model, the Packers had a 10% chance of winning by going for it on fourth down and a 9.5% chance of winning by kicking a field goal.
The model also suggested the Packers needed a 21% chance of converting to justify going for a touchdown there, with a league-average conversion rate in that spot at 23%. The Packers were the No. 1 scoring offense this season.
It seems, then, that the Win Probability model says I am right about a field goal being a bad call but wrong about it being obviously a bad call—the chance of winning after kicking a field goal is almost the same as the chance of winning after trying for a touchdown on fourth down. I agree with something the article suggests without stating explicitly: what by the model is true generally for all teams is more true for the Packers, since the strength of their team is their offense, especially their play-making quarterback. By kicking a field goal, they raised the chance that they'd lose without Aaron Rodgers taking another snap.
The Win Probability model intrigues me. I assume it's based on what has in fact happened in past NFL games? In that case, it seems the sample size relating to the situation the Packers faced must be relatively small, and that the model therefore would be relatively unreliable.
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